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Paramountcy and Tobacco
Peter W. Hogg*

I. THE PARAMOUNTCY RULE
A federal system has to have a rule to resolve conflicts between federal
(national) laws and provincial (state) laws. Oddly enough, the need for
such a rule escaped the framers of the British North America Act in
1867, and they made no provision for conflicts between federal and
provincial laws. It was left to the courts to invent the rule, and they
decided that, in case of conflict between a federal and provincial law,
the federal law is paramount.1 Obviously, the doctrine of paramountcy
means that the provincial law must yield to the federal law to the extent
of the conflict. But what exactly is the status of the provincial law? The
answer is that the provincial law is not rendered invalid or ultra vires;
nor is it repealed; it is rendered “inoperative”. The difference between
“inoperative” and the alternatives is that the operation of the provincial
law is suspended for as long as the conflicting federal law remains in
force; if the federal law is repealed, the provincial law will
automatically revive (come back into operation) without any reenactment by the provincial legislature.2
It is the meaning of conflict or inconsistency (I treat these two terms
as synonymous) that has proved most troublesome, and is the topic of
this paper. It is worth noting at the outset that the definition of conflict
carries profound implications for the scope of federal review and for the
balance of legislative power within the federation. Given the overriding
force of federal law, a wide definition of conflict will result in the defeat
of provincial laws in “fields” that are “covered” by federal law. This is
the course of judicial activism, because it leads to the striking down of
provincial laws. In that sense, it favours central power. A narrow
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definition of conflict, on the other hand, will allow provincial laws to
survive so long as they do not “expressly contradict” a federal law. This
is the course of judicial restraint, because it leaves provincial laws in
place except where they give rise to unavoidable conflict. In that sense,
it favours provincial power.

II. COVERING THE FIELD
The broadest definition of inconsistency is the covering-the-field (or
negative implication) test, which was well articulated by Cartwright J. in
O’Grady v. Sparling.3 In that case, the issue was whether a provincial
highway traffic offence of driving carelessly (without due care and
attention) was in conflict with the federal Criminal Code offence of
driving recklessly. Justice Cartwright, dissenting, would have found the
two laws to be in conflict. Here is how he described the test:
In my opinion, when Parliament has expressed in an Act its decision
that a certain kind or degree of negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle shall be punishable as a crime against the state it follows that it
has decided that no less culpable kind or degree of negligence in such
operation shall be so punishable. By necessary implication the Act
says not only what kinds or degrees of negligence shall be punishable
but also what kinds or degrees shall not.4

The premise of this reasoning is that when Parliament enacted the
Criminal Code offence of reckless driving, it intended to cover the field
of negligent driving, and pre-empt any provincial law in the same field.
In other words, the express terms of the Act carried a negative
implication that there should be no provincial laws in the same field.
Justice Cartwright’s opinion in O’Grady v. Sparling was a
dissenting one. The majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Judson J., rejected the covering-the-field test, holding that
“both provisions could live together and operate concurrently”.5 Other
cases also rejected the covering-the-field test. Justice Cartwright
dissented in two other cases decided at the same time. In Stephens v.
The Queen,6 the majority of the Court held that there was no conflict

3
4
5
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between the provincial highway traffic offence of failing to remain at
the scene of an accident and the federal Criminal Code offence of
failing to remain at the scene of an accident “with intent to escape civil
or criminal liability”. In Smith v. The Queen,7 the majority of the Court
held that there was no conflict between the provincial securities law
offence of furnishing false information in a prospectus and the federal
Criminal Code offence of making, circulating or publishing a false
prospectus. Other cases decided in the 1960s and 1970s refused to find
conflict when provincial laws were in the same field as federal laws, and
even when the provincial laws were very similar to federal laws. Justice
Cartwright himself, after dissenting in the three 1960 cases that I have
just described, bowed to precedent and joined with the other members of
the Court in rejecting the covering-the-field test in the later cases.8

III. EXPRESS CONTRADICTION
By 1982, it was clear that covering the field was not the test for
determining whether there was conflict between a federal and a
provincial law. But it was not at all clear what the actual test was. In
contrast to Cartwright J.’s admirable clarity of definition, albeit in a lost
cause, the majority opinions in the chain of cases through the 1960s and
1970s mostly contented themselves with vague affirmations that laws
could “live together” or could “co-exist” or were not in “direct conflict”,
without clarifying what laws could not live together or could not coexist or would be in direct conflict. Only Martland J. articulated a test
with some real traction. Writing one of the two concurring opinions that
made up the majority in Smith v. The Queen, the false prospectus case
mentioned earlier,9 he said that there was “no conflict in the sense that
compliance with one law involves breach of the other”.10 The case
where the provincial law could not be obeyed except by breaking the
federal law was an “express contradiction”. On any view of the law, that
had to be a conflict that triggered paramountcy. But was it the only case
of conflict?

7
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[1960] S.C.J. No. 47, [1960] S.C.R. 776.
The story is told in Hogg, supra, note 1, s. 17.4(a), “Covering the field”.
Supra, note 7.
[1960] S.C.J. No. 47, [1960] S.C.R. 776, at 800.
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In Multiple Access v. McCutcheon,11 Dickson J., writing for a
majority of the Supreme Court, brought his sharp mind to bear on the
question. The issue in the case was whether there was conflict between
the insider trading provisions of Ontario’s securities law and the
virtually identical provisions of federal corporation law. Despite the
duplication, Dickson J. held that there was no conflict. Indeed, he
pointed out that duplication was the “ultimate in harmony”. He cited
Martland J.’s dictum in Smith with approval,12 and went on to hold that:
In principle, there would seem to be no good reasons to speak of
paramountcy and preclusion except where there is actual conflict in
operation as where one enactment says “yes” and the other says “no”;
“the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things”;
compliance with one is defiance of the other.13

This was a rather clear statement that only an express contradiction
between two laws — where “compliance with one is defiance of the
other”— would suffice to trigger the paramountcy doctrine. This was a
very tight restriction on the paramountcy doctrine, since cases where the
provincial law expressly contradicts the federal law are few and far
between.14
Multiple Access was followed in the Spraytech case.15 The issue in
that case was whether the Town of Hudson had the power to enact a bylaw severely restricting the use of pesticides in the town. The
paramountcy issue arose because the pesticides, the use of which was
prohibited throughout much of the town, satisfied federal standards that
had been enacted to regulate the importation, manufacture, sale and
distribution of pesticides in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada held
that the federal legislation was only permissive. It permitted, but did not
require, the use of the federally-approved pesticides. The by-law’s
prohibition of the use of pesticides did not create an “operational
conflict” with the federal law; compliance with the by-law (by not using
pesticides) would not entail a breach of the federal law.16 And, to
anticipate the next section of the article, it could not be said that the
11
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114957 Canada v. Hudson, [2001] S.C.J. No. 42, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241.
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by-law frustrated the purpose of the federal law. It was not the intention
of the federal law to “grant a blanket authority to pesticides’
manufacturers or distributors to spread them on every spot of greenery
within Canada”.17

IV. FRUSTRATION OF FEDERAL PURPOSE
Multiple Access seemed to have settled the law of paramountcy by
adopting the express contradiction test for conflict. However, in Bank of
Montreal v. Hall,18 the Supreme Court unexpectedly held that the
doctrine of paramountcy rendered inoperative a provincial law that
required a creditor to give notice to a defaulting debtor, giving the
debtor a last opportunity to repay the loan, before bringing proceedings
for foreclosure (to seize and sell the security for the loan). The conflict
was with the federal Bank Act,19 which provided a procedure for
foreclosure by a bank that did not include the giving of this lastopportunity notice to the debtor. This was not a case of express
contradiction. If the bank had served the notice required by provincial
law, it would not have been in breach of the Bank Act. The sole effect
would have been to delay the bank in realizing its security. But La
Forest J., writing for the Court, claimed that there was an “actual
conflict in operation” and that “compliance with the federal statute
necessarily entails defiance of its provincial counterpart”. Although the
decision was framed in the language of express contradiction, the
holding that the provincial law was inoperative seemed to depend on
something very like the old covering-the-field test. The Bank Act had
enacted a complete code with respect to enforcement of bank loans, and
supplemental provincial law had to yield to that code. An alternative
way of looking at the case was that it depended on a judicial finding that
the purpose of the Bank Act would be frustrated if the bank had to
comply with the provincial law.
The latter explanation was accepted and applied in Law Society of
B.C. v. Mangat.20 In that case, the provincial Legal Profession Act21
required that only lawyers could appear as counsel before administrative
17
18
19
20
21

Id., at para. 46 per LeBel J.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 9, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121.
S.C. 1991, c. 46
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S.B.C. 1998, c. 9.
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tribunals and boards (including those established under federal law).
The federal Immigration Act22 provided that, in proceedings before the
Immigration and Refugee Board a party could be represented by a nonlawyer. Once again, there was no express contradiction, since a person
appearing before the board could comply with both laws by retaining a
lawyer. However, the Supreme Court, speaking through Gonthier J.,
pointed out that the purpose of the Immigration Act provision was to
provide an informal, accessible and speedy process, in which parties
could be represented by agents who spoke their language, understood
their culture and were inexpensive. That purpose would often be
defeated if only lawyers were permitted to appear before the board.
Justice Gonthier held that compliance with the provincial law “would go
contrary to Parliament’s purpose in enacting [the representation
provisions] of the Immigration Act”.23 In that sense, there was a conflict
in operation between the provincial and the federal law. For that reason,
the Court held that the provincial law was inoperative in its application
to proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Protection Board.
As the result of the Bank of Montreal and Mangat cases, it is clear
that Canadian courts now accept a second case of inconsistency,
namely, where a provincial law would frustrate the purpose of a federal
law. Where there are overlapping federal and provincial laws, and it is
possible to comply with both laws, but the effect of the provincial law
would be to frustrate the purpose of the federal law, that is also a case of
inconsistency. In deference to Multiple Access, the Court seems to
regard the frustration-of-federal-purpose test as a subset of express
contradiction, although it is much less “express” than the impossibility
of dual compliance. The new test requires the courts to interpret the
federal law to determine what the federal purpose is, and then to
determine whether the provincial law would have the effect of
frustrating the federal purpose. If the answer is yes, then paramountcy
renders the provincial law inoperative.
The latest news at the level of the Supreme Court of Canada — and
the reason for the word “tobacco” in the title to this article — is
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges v. Saskatchewan.24 In that case, the federal
Tobacco Act25 prohibited the promotion of tobacco products, except as
22
23
24
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authorized elsewhere in the Act, and the Act went on to provide that “a
person may display, at retail, a tobacco product”. The Saskatchewan
Tobacco Control Act26 banned the display of tobacco products in any
premises in which persons under 18 years of age were permitted. The
Supreme Court of Canada, speaking through Major J., interpreted the
federal permission to display as intended to circumscribe the prohibition
on promotion, and not to create a positive “entitlement” to display. That
meant that a retailer could comply with both laws, either by refusing to
admit persons under 18 or by not displaying tobacco products. But what
about the frustration of the federal purpose? Did not the express
permission to display indicate a federal purpose to allow retailers to
display tobacco products? No, answered the Court. Both the general
purpose of the Tobacco Act (which was “to address a national health
problem”) and the specific purpose of the permission to display (which
was “to circumscribe the Tobacco Act’s general prohibition on
promotion”) “remain fulfilled”.27
With respect, there is much to be said on the other side of this issue.
Parliament did, no doubt, recognize a national health problem, but it
chose to “regulate” tobacco use only by restricting Charter-protected
commercial expression. Parliament had to do that within the reasonable
limits allowed by section 1 of the Charter of Rights. Indeed, the
previous version of the Act had been struck down as an unreasonable
limit on freedom of expression.28 The express permission to retailers to
display the product was an effort to impose a reasonable limit on the
prohibition of commercial speech about a product that retailers were
lawfully entitled to sell. By narrowing the federal limit on the
prohibition of commercial speech, the provincial law arguably frustrated
an important general purpose of the federal Act, which was to comply
with the Charter of Rights.29 And, having regard to the impracticality of
excluding persons under 18 from the supermarkets, convenience stores,
news stands, gas stations and other retail outlets where cigarettes are
sold, the provincial law surely frustrated the specific purpose of the
26

S.S. 2001, c. T-14.1.
Id., at para. 25.
28
RJR-MacDonald v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. The current
version of the Act is now under challenge in the Quebec courts as an unreasonable limit on freedom
of expression.
29
The Court did not address the interesting question of whether the imposition by federal
law of reasonable limits on a Charter right could be undermined by supplementary provincial laws
that expand the violation of the Charter right beyond the federally set limits.
27
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explicit permission to display. The Court, however, decided otherwise,
holding that the provincial law did not frustrate the purpose of the
federal law, and, therefore, was not rendered inoperative by
paramountcy. The Court acknowledged that it was influenced30 by the
curious decision of the Attorney General of Canada (normally so careful
to protect federal turf) to intervene in the litigation on the side of the
province, despite the fact that the provincial law undermined a federal
law that expressly granted permission to display tobacco products at
retail.

V. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the recent cases that the Supreme Court of Canada does
not infer an inconsistency between federal and provincial laws based on
an imputation that federal law “covers the field” or carries a “negative
implication” forbidding supplementary provincial law in the same field.
However, as we noted earlier, the Court will infer an inconsistency
where it concludes that a federal law has a purpose that would be
frustrated by a provincial law. Cases where the provincial law frustrates
the purpose of a federal law are not easily distinguishable from the old
covering-the-field test, since they interpret the federal law as implicitly
intending to foreclose at least some kinds of supplementary provincial
law. The Court has to make a judgment as to whether the two laws can
indeed live together, bearing in mind not just the compatibility of the
provincial law with the literal requirements of the federal law, but also
the compatibility of the provincial law with the purpose of the federal
law. Because there is no objective way of ascertaining the purpose of a
particular federal law, and no objective way of determining whether a
provincial law would frustrate that purpose, the decisions have become
highly unpredictable.
The clarity of the Multiple Access ruling that only an express
contradiction will serve as a conflict for the purpose of triggering
federal paramountcy has been completely lost. Of course, clarity is not
the only value served by rules of constitutional law, and it may be that
express contradiction was simply too narrow a definition to recognize
all the varieties of conflict that really did have the effect of derogating
from a federal law. In particular, the Mangat case illustrates why
30
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express contradiction is too narrow a test. In that case, the provincial
law requiring only lawyers to appear before federal boards would have
seriously undermined the goals of the federal law permitting nonlawyers to appear before the Immigration and Refugee Board, even
though compliance with the provincial law (by hiring a lawyer) would
not have caused a breach of the federal law. The Bank of Montreal case
is much less clear, and the reasoning is not to be found in the judicial
opinion. But it is arguable that requiring banks to comply with
provincial rules respecting foreclosure would frustrate the purpose of
the federal Bank Act’s regulation of the process. In the Rothmans case,
the federal law’s express permission to retailers to display tobacco
products seemed, at the very least, to indicate a federal purpose to allow
display (as a reasonable limit on freedom of expression), and yet the
Court held that severe provincial restrictions on display did not frustrate
the purpose. Obviously, the courts retain a lot of discretion in deciding
these cases, and it may be that the Court in Rothmans was reluctant to
interfere with provincial efforts to limit tobacco use.
The Supreme Court will have another opportunity to examine the
paramountcy doctrine, when it decides the appeal from the decision of
the Alberta Court of Appeal in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta.31 At
issue here is whether the province of Alberta may impose on the banks a
licensing regime for the promotion of creditors’ insurance to the banks’
customers. The federal Bank Act and regulations under the Act permit
the banks to promote the sale of certain defined types of “insurance” to
their customers. The insurance is mostly of the kind in which the bank is
the beneficiary, and the proceeds would pay off a bank loan in the event
of (for example) the death, disability or loss of employment of the
debtor. The effect of the Alberta regulation is to impose a layer of
provincial regulation on the promotion of Bank-Act-authorized
insurance by the banks. The sanction for non-compliance with the
Alberta law is the denial of a licence to a bank to promote authorized
insurance in the province. Does this frustrate the purpose of the Bank
Act’s authorization of the promotion of insurance by the banks? The
Alberta Court of Appeal said no, leaving the banks to comply with the
provincial licensing requirements on pain of losing their power to

31

[2005] A.J. No. 21, 2005 ABCA 12.
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promote insurance in the province.32 The Supreme Court of Canada
heard the appeal on April 11, 2006, and has not yet (as of August 1,
2006) rendered a judgment.

32
The other issue in the case was whether the provincial law was inapplicable to the
banks’ promotion of insurance on the ground of interjurisdictional immunity; the Court answered
that question no as well. The opposite conclusion had earlier been reached by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Canada (Superintendent of Financial Institutions),
[2003] B.C.J. No. 92, 11 B.C.L.R. (4th) 206 (C.A.). The B.C. Court did not need to decide the
paramountcy issue and did not do so.

